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"During recent years, we have reversed no small number of cases for
fundamental error in the court's charge."' The meaning of fundamental
error in courts' charges to juries becomes clearer now with Cumbie v.
State.2 Recognizing that the en bane decision of Gooden v. State3 settled
the rule requiring reversal when the charge contains fundamental error,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Cumbie discussed four possible
types of fundamental error.4 Error occurs when: (1) the court's charge
omits an allegation in the indictment that is required to be proved, such as
a culpable mental state;5 (2) the charge to the jury substitutes a theory of
the offense completely different from the theory alleged in the indictment;6
(3) the charge to the jury authorizes conviction on the theory alleged in the
indictment and on one or more other theories not alleged in the indict-
ment;7 and (4) the charge authorizes conviction for conduct that could not
* B.A., California State University; J.D., University of Texas. Associate Professor of
Law, St. Mary's University.
1. Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
2. Id.
3. 576 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
4. 578 S.W.2d at 733-35.
5. West v. State, 567 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
6. Shaw v. State, 557 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
7. "Such a charge would permit conviction on proof different from (and sometimes
less than), that required to prove the allegations in the indictment." Cumbie v. State, 578
S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Several recent aggravated robbery cases illustrate
this kind of error. Aldaco v. State, 576 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Clements v.
State, 576 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Gooden v. State, 576 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979); Armstead v. State, 573 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Brewer v. State, 572
S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Smith v. State, 570 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
Many robbery cases have been submitted to the juries on every theory of robbery and aggra-
vated robbery found in TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02-.03 (Vernon 1974), regardless of
the allegations in the indictment. Williams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);
Hill v. State, 576 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Todd v. State, 576 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); McGee v. State, 575 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Bridges v. State,
574 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). See also Lee v. State, 577 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979). Other than robbery cases illustrating this enlargement on the indictment, there
have been the following types of cases: voluntary manslaughter, Garcia v. State, 574 S.W.2d
133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Fella v. State, 573 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); injury to
a child, Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); prostitution, Thompson v.
State, 577 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon,
Smith v. State, 574 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); aggravated rape, Lowry v. State, 579
S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); burglary, Albert v. State, 579 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979); and indecency with a child, Sandig v. State, 580 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979).
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constitute the offense charged.' This charge not only enlarges upon the
indictment but also defines noncriminal conduct as an offense.
Any one of the four kinds of fundamental errors in the court's charge to
the jury will result in reversal on appeal even though the error is not called
to the trial court's attention.9 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals en
banc has determined, however, that these fundamental errors in the court's
charge to the jury must be raised on appeal since refusal of habeas corpus
relief is not a denial of due process.'0 Thus, the error in the charge that is
fundamental at trial or on appeal is not always fundamental error that
requires habeas corpus relief."
Exparte Coleman posed this question: "Will an error in the instruction
to find Coleman guilty, if he caused bodily injury to the complainant or
threatened serious bodily injury violate due process because robbery by
committing bodily injury was not alleged in the indictment?"' 2 The in-
dictment charged only that the defendant had placed the complainant in
fear of imminent bodily injury or death by using and exhibiting a deadly
weapon.' 3 The dimensions of the due process clause have been delineated
by the Supreme Court: "[Tihe Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."' 4 The
jury charge in Coleman enlarged upon the allegations of the indictment
and permitted the accused to be convicted under a statutory offense other
than that alleged in the indictment. This would constitute fundamental
error on appeal but is not subject to a collateral attack by way of a habeas
corpus. 5 Rarely will error in an instruction to the jury be based on consti-
tutional grounds.' 6 Ex parte Clark"' closely followed Coleman and di-
vided the court. The court granted habeas corpus relief because the trial
court's charge failed to apply the law to the facts, thus infringing upon
both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution. Such an
infringement is fundamental to the case and denies the fair and impartial
trial to which an accused is entitled under the due process provisions of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution' 8 and the due
course of law provision in article 1, section 19 of the Texas Constitution.' 9
The Coleman trial judge apparently applied the law to the facts; his error,
not of constitutional dimension for purposes of habeas corpus, was to ap-
ply all the statutory definitions of robbery and aggravated robbery and not
8. Jackson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Dowden v. State, 537
S.W.2d 5, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
9. Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
10. Exparte Coleman, 574 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
11. Id. at 165.
12. Id.
13. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02-.03 (Vernon 1974).
14. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
15. 574 S.W.2d at 165.
16. Id.
17. No. 62,655 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 1979).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
19. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19.
[Vol. 34
CRIMINAL LAW
just the one for which the defendant had been indicted. The Clark trial
judge instructed by abstract definitions and did not apply any of the law to
the facts. Such an error did rise to constitutional dimension for purposes
of habeas corpus.
The court has granted habeas corpus relief in a variety of cases when an
essential element of the offense was omitted from the charging instrument.
Relief was granted in credit card abuse cases in which the indictment
failed to allege that the defendant "intended to obtain the property fraudu-
lently and that he acted with knowledge that the card was not issued to
him."2 ° Relief was granted when a charging instrument failed to allege a
necessary element of "escape."2 Post-conviction application for habeas
corpus relief resulted in dismissal of theft cases wherein enhancement was
effected by proof of two prior misdemeanor convictions.22 When the court
found that one of the prior convictions was based upon a fatally defective
information, omitting a necessary element of the offense, the court permit-
ted the petitioner to attack the enhancement provisions of that indictment
by a post-conviction writ.23 Other instances in which relief was granted
because of fatally defective charging instruments include convictions for
criminal mischief,24 unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,25 and burglary.26
Under the authority of article 40.09, section 13 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, 27 the court of criminal appeals will review a funda-
mentally defective indictment or information 28 as unassigned error, "in the
interest of justice." Probably the most significant effect of a fatally defec-
tive charging instrument concerns probation revocation. When a defend-
ant's sentence of probation is a result of a conviction based upon a fatally
defective indictment or information, the original conviction based on that
charging instrument will be set aside in an appeal from a probation revo-
cation proceeding.29 The jurisdiction of the court is not invoked by a
fundmentally defective indictment, and such defect may therefore be no-
ticed .or raised at any time, including on appeal from an order revoking
probation. It follows that habeas corpus relief after revocation of proba-
tion will be granted for the same reason.
20. Exparte Sharpe, 581 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Mathis, 580
S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979): Exparte Dawson, 578 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979); Exparte Mathis, 571 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. Appi 1978). See also Exparte Seaton,
580 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
21. Exparte Abbey, 574 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Exparte McCurdy, 571
S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
22. Exparte Lucky, 571 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
23. Id.
24. Exparte Dobbins, 571 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
25. Exparte Ellis, 579 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
26. Exparte Cranford, 579 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
27. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09, § 13 (Vernon 1979).
28. Arden v. State, 572 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
29. Morgan v. State, 571 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
30. Daniels v. State, 573 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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II. JURY CHARGES
When the error does not injure the rights of the defendant or deny him a
fair and impartial trial, error in the court's charge does not require rever-
sal. When the trial court charged both on murder 3' and on the separate
offense of injury to a child,32 which latter count had been abandoned by
the state, the defendant's rights were not injured since he was convicted of
murder.33 This ruling follows Texas law that finds no harm of which a
defendant may complain when the jury charge might have benefited
him.34
In cases involving burglary of a habitation 35 a question has arisen as to
how the requirement of specific intent to commit theft or a felony may be
presented in an instruction to the jury, when the facts show only that the
person is discovered inside the house, and nothing has been disturbed.
The question of intent is, of course, a fact question for the jury. The de-
fendant in Stearn v. State36 requested a charge on circumstantial evidence,
but the request was denied by the trial court. Affirming the conviction, the
court held that when intent is the only element of the offense to be deter-
mined by circumstances, a charge on circumstantial evidence is not re-
quired.37
Although a circumstantial evidence charge under proper circumstances
is required in Texas cases,38 in many other jurisdictions it is not.39 Texas
seems to be moving away from the past rigid construction of this rule. At
the present time, when confronted with a proper request for an instruction
on circumstantial evidence, a trial judge should ask two questions: "(1) Is
there any direct evidence on the main fact essential to guilt? (2) If no such
direct evidence exists, are the proven facts so closely related to the main
fact to be proved as to be the equivalent of direct evidence? An instruction
on circumstantial evidence is not required when either question can clearly
be resolved in the affirmative." 4 A charge on circumstantial evidence is
not required when the facts are in such a close relationship to the main fact
to be proven as to be equivalent to direct testimony.4 '
Hill v. Stateg2 reiterates the traditional Texas law that any defensive the-
ory raised by the evidence must be submitted in an affirmative manner by
instruction to the jury. Over defendant's objection the court charged, in
31. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(a)(I)-(2) (Vernon 1974).
32. Id. § 22.04 (Vernon 1977).
33. DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
34. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1966).
35. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
36. 571 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
37. Id. at 178.
38. Hielscher v. State, 511 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Denny v. State, 473
S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Thurmond v. United States, 377 F.2d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 1967). Seegener-
ally Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 129 (1954).
40. Frazier v. State, 576 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
41. Adams v. State, 588 S.W.2d 597 (Tex Crim. App. 1979); Ales v. State, 587 S.W.2d
686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
42. 585 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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part, "that the death of [A] was caused by the defendant, if it was, having
choked or beaten her with his hands, if he did, or if you have a reasonable
doubt thereof, you will resolve such doubt in favor of the defendant and
find him not guilty.' 43 The court of criminal appeals held that this charge
does not constitute an affirmative submission of the defensive theory (here,
death by natural cause) and is erroneous. 44
Admonishing the bench and bar to avoid fundamental error in jury in-
structions, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has referred them to
forms and source materials. 45 The court noted that the indictment controls
the application of the law to the facts. By adhering to this rule, the trial
courts cannot commit error by expanding on the allegations in the
charge.46
The jury instructions in Fortenberry v. State,47 a capital murder case
involving the death of a peace officer,48 were inadequate and required re-
versal. The objection by the defendant was that the accomplice witness
instruction failed to direct the jury to the requirement that the accomplice's
testimony be corroborated by the facts that make the case a death penalty
case.49 This would require an instruction on corroboration of the elements
of that offense, including that the officer was acting in lawful discharge of
an official duty and that the defendant knew the deceased was a peace
officer. An accomplice's testimony must be corroborated as to those ele-
ments of the offense, such as knowledge, that must be proved.5"
III. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Holding that federal habeas corpus is a proper proceeding by which a
state prisoner may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that was the
basis of his conviction, the Supreme Court of the United States outlined
the standard for federal courts to apply.' The question presented was
whether the constitutional rule of In re Winshi 52 compels a new criterion
by which the validity of a state court conviction must be tested in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. Answering affirmatively, the Supreme Court
indicated that the record must reflect sufficient evidence to justify a ra-
tional trier of the facts to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.53 The "no
43. Id. at 714.
44. Id.; cf. Wilson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (misidentifica-
tion of the defendant may be properly refused as the basis for an affirmative jury charge
since the requirement that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the offense, and the instructions on presumption of innocence (in this case the
additional instruction on the law of alibi) adequately protect the defendant and substantially
incorporate the requested instructions).
45. Hawkins v. State, 579 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
46. Id. at 925.
47. 579 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
48. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
49. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979).
50. 579 S.W.2d at 486.
51. Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
52. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 2792, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77.
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evidence" doctrine of Thompson v. Louisville,54 which had been the guide
for such a review, no longer applies. Rejecting the Thompson test, the
Court held that the standard to be applied is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."
Many Texas convictions have fallen since the decisions in Burks v.
United States56 and Greene v. Massey.57 Both misdemeanor and felony
convictions have toppled as a result of determinations of insufficient evi-
dence. Various offenses have been set aside, including burglary of a build-
ing, 8 burglary of a habitation,59 credit card abuse,60 evading arrest,6 '
forgery,62 making a false report to a police officer,63 murder,64 possession
of marijuana,65 and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.66 Burks and
Greene have now progressed to the post-conviction stage, and a conviction
based upon insufficient evidence may be successfully attacked by applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus.67 Retroactive relief may be granted when
the original conviction was reversed on insufficiency of the evidence.
When accomplice testimony has not been corroborated at trial in state
court, thereby creating insufficiency of evidence in the case, Burks and
Greene will be given retroactive effect.
68
IV. PARTIES To THE OFFENSE
In Mendez v. State69 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was con-
fronted with the novel question of whether the law of parties applies to the
offense of involuntary manslaughter. Criminal responsibility for another's
actions is established by statutes defining "parties. 7° In Mendez the ap-
pellant accompanied a companion who, in the midst of a shooting spree,
shot randomly at several houses. The appellant did not shoot at the
houses, and there was testimony that he and another tried to dissuade their
54. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
56. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
57. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
58. Owens v. State, 576 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
59. Robinson v. State, 570 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
60. Johnson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
61. Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
62. Chase v. State, 573 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Pfleging v. State, 572
S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
63. Wood v. State, 577 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
64. Earnhart v. State, 575 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
65. Reyes v. State, 575 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
66. Schershel v. State, 575 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
67. Exparte Mixon, 583 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979),petition docketed, No. 79-
608, 48 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1979).
68. Exparte Colunga, 587 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
69. 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
70. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974), which states that an indi-
vidual is responsible for the acts of another if he acts "with intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense, [and in so doing] he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts
to aid the other person to commit the offense."
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companion from shooting. One person was struck by a random bullet and
died. The appellant contended that he was not guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter under the parties theory because there can be no accomplice to
that offense. Since the principal who commits an involuntary manslaugh-
ter does not act with a specific intent, he cannot be assisted by another.
The court distinguished Gonzales v. State,7 which held that attempted in-
voluntary manslaughter was not an offense in Texas. It is true that one
cannot attempt with specific intent a crime lacking any element of specific
intent, such as involuntary manslaughter. The court stated, however, "[ilt
is entirely possible to intentionally solicit or assist an individual in com-
mitting a reckless act. We hold that the law of parties does apply to the
substantive offense of involuntary manslaughter."72
The earlier holding of Romo v. State73 has been reaffirmed in Bowers v.
State.74 In Romo it was held that a charge on the law of parties is not
necessary when there is no objection by the defendant to a failure to
charge on party culpability.75 The dissent reasoned that such an omission
was fundamental error in that the charge failed to apply the law under
which the accused was prosecuted, and failure to object does not constitute
waiver if this error in the charge is a denial of due process.7 6 The careful
defense counsel, however, will present timely objections concerning party
culpability, or these may be waived.
The defendant in Ruiz v. State77 was convicted of capital murder.78 The
court stated that the essential elements of the offense were: "(1) the appel-
lant conspired with others to commit an aggravated robbery and (2) one of
the co-conspirators (3) intentionally or knowingly (4) caused the death of
an individual (5) in the course of committing or attempting to commit the
aggravated robbery (6) in furtherance of the unlawful purpose of the con-
spiracy and (7) which should have been anticipated as a result of carrying
out the conspiracy. '79 The state prosecuted the defendant as a party to the
offense of capital murder under the conspiracy theory expressed in section
7.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. Reversing the case on another ground,
the court of criminal appeals determined that this portion of the criminal
responsibility statute "eliminates any necessity on the part of the State to
prove. . . intent to kill. . . .The evidence. . . would permit any jury to
infer that the aggravated robbery was committed as a result of a conspir-
71. 532 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
72. 575 S.W.2d at 38. The court also noted there is a clear trend in other jurisdictions to
hold the law of parties applicable to involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 37. See, e.g., Wade v.
State, 174 Tenn. 248, 124 S.W.2d 710 (1939); Black v. State, 103 Ohio St. 434, 133 N.E. 795
(1921).
73. 568 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
74. 570 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
75. 568 S.W.2d at 302. For an example of such error rising to constitutional dimension,
see Exparle Clark, No. 62,655 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 1979); text accompanying note 17
supra.
76. Id. at 308 (Onion, J., dissenting).
77. 579 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
78. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
79. 579 S.W.2d at 209.
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acy and that a murder should have been anticipated in the carrying out of
the conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery."8
V. COMPETENCY
In determining what is a meaningful retrospective competency hearing
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined the question as whether the
"quantity and quality of available evidence [is] adequate to arrive at an
assessment that could be labelled as more than mere speculation."8' The
trial court to which proceedings are remanded for such a hearing must
make the initial determination of meaningfulness. If the issue of compe-
tency to stand trial is raised after conviction, the convicted defendant may
be entitled to a competency hearing at that late time in the proceedings.
He must first show, however, that the state or federal court failed to pro-
vide him with a fair competency hearing prior to or during his trial. After
that predicate is laid, the trial court must determine the meaningfulness of
such a procedure. The trial court must first determine whether it is possi-
ble to reconstruct the defendant's mental state at the time prior to his trial.
If the trial court finds that a meaningful competency hearing cannot be
conducted, the defendant may be entitled to a new trial. If the court deter-
mines that a meaningful competency hearing can be conducted, the hear-
ing is conducted and a disposition of the case is made accordingly.82
In Zapata v. Estelle83 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when
the trial court ignores a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence
to stand trial, the Supreme Court decision in Pate v. Robinson84 requires a
nunc pro tunc competency hearing if a meaningful inquiry can still be had.
If not, the defendant must be retried if found competent, or released. If
there was a bona fide doubt of the defendant's competence to stand trial,
the defendant's due process right not to be tried while he is incompetent
will be applied retroactively. In Johnston v. State86 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals addressed the question at the state level and ruled in
accordance with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.87
Corley v. State88 concerned the application of the test in Dusky v. United
States89 for present competency to stand trial. The trial court, over de-
fense objections and in spite of the proffered jury charge that tracked both
Dusky and the similar provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
80. Id.
81. Martin v. Estelle, 583 F.2d 1373, 1374 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 536
F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1976)).
82. See id.; Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1979).
83. 588 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1979).
84. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
85. 588 F.2d at 1020.
86. 587 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see Caballero v. State, 587 S.W.2d 741
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
87. 587 S.W.2d at 165. The court did not, however, cite to Zapata.
88. 582 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
89. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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dure,90 overruled the objections and submitted its own charge to the jury.
The issue was whether the charge denied the defendant due process at the
competency trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that al-
though Pate raised the competency procedure to a constitutional position
by guaranteeing the defendant's right to such a hearing, the Supreme
Court decision in Dusky does not mean that there is only one way to deter-
mine a person's competency. As long as the charge is broad enough to
comply with Dusky and provides adequate procedural safeguards to en-
sure that an incompetent individual will not be convicted, the defendant is
not denied due process.9'
Sections 1 and 2(b) of article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure allow the trial judge properly to withdraw a competency matter from
an already empaneled jury and find as a matter of law that the defendant
is presently sane.9 2 The contention of the defendant in Rivera v. State93
was that the trial court, sua sponte, may not take the question of compe-
tency away from the jury once the jury has been empaneled. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the issue of present insanity should
not be submitted to the jury that has been empaneled for that purpose
unless there is competent evidence supporting that issue.94 The court
thereby interpreted the statutes as mandating a removal of the incompe-
tency issue from the jury, even after the competency hearing has begun,
when the issue is not supported by competent testimony.95
The absolute right to introduce extraneous offenses to rebut a defense of
insanity96 has been overruled.97 Extraneous offenses may, however, be
probative of the presence or absence of insanity and are admissible in such
instances. But the fact that another offense was committed does not, by
itself, tend to rebut a claim of insanity.98
VI. CAPITAL MURDER
In Wilder v. State9 9 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a
defendant can be found guilty of capital murder and may also be assessed
the death penalty even when the victim was killed by a co-defendant
rather than by the defendant himself. The decision in Wilder is in accord
90. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 1(a) (Vernon 1979) provides: "A person
is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a resonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
91. 582 S.W.2d at 818-19.
92. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, §§ 1-2(b) (Vernon 1979).
93. 581 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
94. Id. at 163.
95. Id.
96. Sanders v. State, 450 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Sanders v. State, 449
S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
97. Holley v. State, 582 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
98. Id. at 119.
99. 583 SW.2d 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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with an earlier decision" of the court that reached the same result and
held that sections 7.01 and 7.02 of the Texas Penal Code' 0 ' apply to sec-
tion 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code,0 2 the capital murder statute, and to
article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 0 3 the capital sen-
tencing procedures.
Also in Wilder"° the relevancy of evidence presented at the punishment
phase was questioned. The court noted that article 37.071(a)"°5 has been
interpreted as allowing the trial judge wide discretion in the evidence that
may be introduced. The court held that the capital sentencing statutes do
not require a final conviction of an extraneous offense in order for such
evidence to be admissible at the punishment phase.' 0 6
The jury may consider the evidence presented at the guilt phase in order
to resolve the three special issues submitted at the punishment phase. 0 7 If
there is no previous extraneous offense or final conviction of the defend-
100. Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977).
101. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01 (Vernon 1974), concerning parties to offenses, pro-
vides in part: "(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is
committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally respon-
sible, or by both. (b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the
offense." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1974), concerning criminal responsibility
for the conduct of another, states:
(a) A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the con-
duct of another if:
(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense,
he solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other per-
son to commit the offense ....
(b) If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another
felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty
of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if
the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and
was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out
of the conspiracy.
See, e.g., Ruiz v. State, 579 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
102. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
103. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973) provides, inter alia, that
upon a finding of the guilt of the defendant for a capital offense, the court must conduct a
separate sentencing procedure. After the presentation of the evidence, the court must submit
these issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Id.
104. 583 S.W.2d at 361; see Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
105. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 1(a) (Vernon 1973) provides, inter alia, that
evidence may be presented in the proceeding as to any matter that the court deems relevant
to the sentence.
106. 583 S.W.2d at 361.
107. McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); see note 103 supra.
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ant, other evidence of actions both prior to and after the primary offense
may be considered by the jury at the punishment phase. Prior conduct of
the defendant at the jail pending trial, which showed the defendant's atti-
tude and treatment of other inmates in the jail, has been held admissible in
the punishment trial.' It is apparent that the court construes the term
"prior conduct" broadly when determining the relevancy of evidence at
the punishment phase. When the extraneous offense is introduced into ev-
idence at the guilt or innocence phase of a capital murder case, however,
the traditional and more rigid standard is employed.'0 9
The "category of cases" view was acknowledged in Texas criminal law
in Batten v. State" o and was reaffirmed in Exparte Dowden." This doc-
trine requires that all of the mandatory procedures 1 2 in death penalty
cases be followed in any of the offenses categorized as capital crimes, re-
gardless of whether the death penalty is sought. Even on a plea of guilty to
capital murder in which punishment is assessed by the court at life impris-
onment, the defendant and the state may not waive a jury trial. 3 Such a
waiver would be an attempt to use part of the capital statutes, but not all.
The category of cases view also prohibits the denial by the trial judge of
fifteen peremptory strikes to the defendant, when the state, in a capital
case, "waives" the death penalty.' 14 The category of cases standard also
precludes the waiver of the death penalty by the state in a capital case." 5
The court of criminal appeals strained to reconcile the holding in
Dowden with that in Allen v. State. 16 Allen, who committed capital mur-
der while a juvenile, was indicted and tried for capital murder. The Allen
majority discussed the category of cases view, affirming the trial court's
conviction for capital murder and its assessment of life imprisonment."
7
The dissenting judge, referring to the same view, pointed out that since
death cannot be a possible punishment for a juvenile offender, the offense
is not a capital one, and the defendant should not have been so indicted." 8
Further, because a jury could not deliberate on punishment in this case, as
108. See Earvin v. State, 582 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
109. Ruiz v. State, 579 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). When aggravated rob-
bery is the underlying offense and the state has the burden of proving the essential elements
of the offense, proof of an extraneous offense may not be introduced properly when a neces-
sary element can be inferred from the act itself.
110. 533 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
I11. 580 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
112. E.g., in a capital felony case (1) the defendant may not waive the right of trial by
jury, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14 (Vernon 1975); (2) a prospective juror must
state under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment will not affect his
deliberations on any issue of fact, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.3 1(b) (Vernon 1974); (3) the
defendant has a right to fifteen peremptory challenges, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
35.15(a) (Vernon 1975); and (4) upon a finding of guilt, the court must submit certain special
issues to the jury, id. art. 37.071. See note 103 supra.
113. 580 S.W.2d at 366.
114. 533 S.W.2d at 793.
115. 580 S.W.2d at 366.
116. 552 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
117. Id. at 847.
118. Id. at 847-48 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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required by article 37.071, this would be a partial use of the capital proce-
dures, which is prohibited by the category of cases view.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has declined to overturn its ear-
lier cases construing Witherspoon v. Illinois."9 In those early cases the
court stated that the inability of the prospective juror to take the oath re-
quired by section 12.31(b) of the Texas Penal Code 2° automatically dis-
qualified him and that the trial judge did not err in sustaining the state's
challenge for cause although the venireman was not questioned under the
Witherspoon rule. The resolution of the conflict in Texas between Wither-
spoon and section 12.31(b), if indeed there is one, appears imminent. In
Burns v. State121 the court repeated its stand that it is unnecessary to con-
sider the Witherspoon question when the prospective juror has been dis-
qualified under section 12.31(b). Garcia v. State122 and Adams v. State123
held likewise.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, by a three-judge panel, granted a
writ of habeas corpus in Burns v. Estelle, 24 holding that the use of section
12.3 1(b) might, in some circumstances, be impermissibly broad. The Fifth
Circuit pointed out that certain challenged venireman in Burns should
have been pressed further as to how the presence of a possible death sen-
tence might "affect" their deliberations. A mere conclusory question
framed in the words of the statute is insufficient to permit disqualification
when that disqualification is based only upon an ambiguous response. The
court stated, "It well may be that, measured by some universal law or stan-
dard, the Texas statute is just and fair. But we must measure by Wither-
spoon, and by it Burns' death sentence cannot stand."' 25
Until granting certiorari in Adams v. State, 26 the Supreme Court of the
United States has declined to examine the conflict between Witherspoon
119. 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see, e.g., Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976). See also Comment, Death Prone Jurors.- The Disintegration ofthe Witherspoon Rule
in Texas, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 288 (1977).
120. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.3 1(b) (Vernon 1974) provides that prospective jurors
shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction
of a capital felony. "A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless
he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not
affect his deliberation on any issue of fact." The Witherspoon rule is that a venireman can
be struck for cause only when he is irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to
vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in
the course of the proceedings. 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
121. 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); see Villarreal v.
State, 576 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 176, 62 L. Ed. 2d 114
(1979).
122. 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
123. 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Dec. 11,
1979). The appellant contended that by permitting the application of § 12.31 (b) to the three
punishment issues specified by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1973), the trial
court allowed the prosecution a broader basis of exclusion than would be allowed under the
Witherspoon rule.
124. 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.), rehearing granted, 598 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1979).
125. 592 F.2d at 1302.




and section 12.31(b) when that question was presented to it on appeal.' 27
After the Fifth Circuit announcement in Burns v. Estelle,128 the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reaffirmed its previous stance in Garcia by a
denial of rehearing. 129 Finally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has or-
dered oral arguments and briefs in the Burns case for an en banc determi-
nation.30 In Jurek v. Estelle, 3' however, the Fifth Circuit held that
failure to object to a Witherspoon violation did not waive the error, as that
was the apparent law in Texas at that time.' 32 Since Jurek involved a clear
Witherspoon violation and apparently no forfeiture at that time of the
habeas corpus claim in the federal system, the result in Jurek is not as
startling as the Burns decision. It is possible that section 12.3 1(b) will meet
the independent and adequate state grounds test enforced within the fed-
eral system,133 and, accordingly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' in-
terpretation of the state statute in state cases will prevail. On the other
hand, section 12.3 1(b) may be struck down as impermissibly broad. A pos-
itive result of the conflict is that counsel for both the state and the defense
in death penalty cases presently question jurors intensely within the scope
of the statute, as they continue to explore the meaning of Witherspoon.
VII. OTHER HOMICIDES
Since 1974 few felony-murder cases 134 are found "on the books." Gar-
rett v. State135 is such a case. The question in Garrett was whether aggra-
vated assault is a valid underlying felony for a felony-murder conviction.
The underlying felony in a felony-murder prosecution supplies the requi-
site culpable mental state and dispenses with proof of intent to cause
death. The prosecution's theory in Garrett was that the intent to commit
aggravated assault was transferred to the act that caused the homicide,
thus supplying the requisite means rea. The Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals reversed the conviction, stating that the act of aggravated assault that
127. Burns v. State 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977).
128. 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.), rehearing granted, 598 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
130. Burns v. Estelle, 598 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1979).
131. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
132. Id. at 681-82.
133. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
This Court from the time of its foundation has adhered to the principle that it
will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independ-
ent state grounds . . . . Our only power over state judgments is to correct
them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights . . . .. If the
same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its
views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advi-
sory opinion.
Id. at 125-26.
134. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974) provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if he. . . commits or attempts to commit a
felony, other than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in the course of
and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from
the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
135. 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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caused the homicide cannot be used to boost the homicide into the murder
category. 136 "The felony that eliminates the quality of the intent must be
one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein
.. "137 The transaction is indivisible. Further, aggravated assault may
be a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, which is precluded
by statute from being the basis of a felony-murder prosecution in Texas. 138
The Garrett decision is the most recent statement of the court of criminal
appeals on the merger doctrine. With the codification of the felony-mur-
der rule in Texas, it can be expected that the merger doctrine will become a
part of the jurisprudence.
Conspiracy to commit capital murder for remuneration 39 was the
charge in Brown v. State.'4 ° Granting the appellant's motion for rehearing
and setting aside the conviction for insufficient evidence, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, en banc, differentiated between the corpus delicti of
murder and conspiracy to murder when there is a confession. While the
corpus delicti of murder, a death caused by criminal means, supports and
corroborates a confession to the murder, and the corpus delicti need not be
entirely independent of the confession, the same rules do not apply in a
conspiracy to murder case. In such a case the corpus delicti must show an
agreement to commit the crime.' 4 ' In Brown the proof failed to show,
beyond the confession itself, that there had been an agreement to commit
murder. "Absent any evidence of the corpus delicti of conspiracy, outside
the extrajudicial confession itself, the conspiracy conviction founded on
that confession cannot stand."'' 42
Doty v. State143 presents a mix-up similar to Hobbs v. State'" concern-
ing the allegations of an indictment for attempted capital murder. In
Hobbs the court determined that attempted capital murder was not alleged
properly but that solicitation of capital murder was sufficiently alleged. "4
The majority in Doty found that the indictment did allege attempted capi-
tal murder.'46 In Hobbs the indictment alleged a further promise to pay,
while in Doty the consideration alleged under the "murder for hire" stat-
ute 147 was framed in both past and future tenses: "paid and promised to
136. Id. at 545.
137. Id. (quoting People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927)).
138. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
139. Id. § 19.03(a)(3) provides that a person commits capital murder if he commits mur-
der under § 19.02(a)(1) and also "commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration." Section 15.02(a) of the Code provides: "A person commits criminal con-
spiracy if, with intent that a felony be committed: (I) he agrees with one or more persons
that they. . . engage in conduct that would constitute the offense; and (2) he or one or more
of them performs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement."
140. 576 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
141. Id. at 43.
142. Id.
143. 585 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
144. Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
145. Id. at 887.
146. 585 S.W.2d at 728.
147. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
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be paid."' 48 The majority held that this language, while not a "model in-
dictment," was a proper allegation of attempt.
The dissent disagreed, however, because the indictment failed to allege
an act that the appellant performed to effect the intended offense of mur-
der. "'49 Thus, the indictment was insufficient because the offense of at-
tempted capital murder was not alleged. Some further act done in the
attempt to kill the intended victim must be alleged. Further, the dissenting
judge argued, without the act done to effect the intended murder, the em-
ployer would be guilty of solicitation to commit capital murder. 5 ° If ei-
ther the employer or employee obtained a gun, that would be an overt act
sufficient to allege conspiracy to commit capital murder against both.' 5'
But if the employee shot at the intended victim, both the employer and
employee may properly be charged with attempted capital murder.' 52 Ac-
cording to the majority in Doty, alleging attempted capital murder would
seem to require nothing more than the employer's paying and promising to
pay the employee, denoting acceptance by the employee. It may be ques-
tioned, however, whether such an act alone is "more than mere prepara-
tion that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense
intended."' 153 Neither is it clear whether evidence that conforms to these
allegations will show proof of an attempt. In other attempted capital mur-
der cases, acts by the defendant constituting the attempt have been alleged
in the indictment. 54 It is the "murder for hire" allegation for attempted
capital murder that creates pitfalls for the persons who draft those indict-
ments.
In Paige v. State 55 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
question whether voluntary manslaughter 56 can be a lesser included of-
fense of murder. The appellant argued that because voluntary manslaugh-
ter has an additional element requiring that the act be committed "under
the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate
cause," '' 57 voluntary manslaughter cannot be a lesser included offense of
murder. Since that argument had been rejected in a prior case, 158 the court
held that the requirement of "sudden passion" is not an element of volun-
tary manslaughter; rather it is in the nature of a defense to murder that
reduces that offense to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaugh-
148. 585 S.W.2d at 728.
149. Id. at 731 (Dally, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 733.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (Vernon 1975) states: "A person commits an
offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than
mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended."
154. See, e.g., Dovalina v. State, 564 S.W.2d 378, 379, 384-85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
155. 573 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
156. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1974).
157. Id.
158. Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1252, 59 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1979).
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ter. 15 9 The state, therefore, need not prove such influence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 6 '
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has confirmed an earlier ruling' 6 '
that if the act relied on to constitute recklessness in an involuntary man-
slaughter prosecution is alleged with sufficiently reasonable certainty to
inform the accused of the nature of the reckless act, the state is not re-
quired to plead such acts in terms of the statutory language. 162 In Parr v.
State'63 the court held that the involuntary manslaughter statute grounded
on driving while intoxicated 64 is constitutional.
In both Moore v. State'6 5 and Branham v. State'6 6 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court for failure to charge on the de-
fensive theory of criminally negligent homicide. 167 In both cases, which
resulted in convictions of involuntary manslaughter, evidence was intro-
duced raising the issue of criminal negligence. Pointing out that criminally
negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaugh-
ter, the court stated that when the evidence raises both issues, upon a
proper request the issues must be submitted to the jury. 168
VIII. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
An evidentiary rule in Fifth Circuit conspiracy cases has been that once
an individual is shown to be clearly connected to the conspiracy group,
only "slight evidence" .is required to support the inference that his partici-
pation was knowing. 169 The "slight evidence" rule has been replaced by
the "substantial evidence" rule. No longer is slight evidence of the defend-
ant's knowledge of the scheme, once the conspiracy has been established,
sufficient to sustain a jury's finding that he was a member of the conspir-
acy.' 70 United States v. Ma/atesta, 17 an en banc decision, now mandates
that "when the sufficiency of the evidence to support any criminal convic-
tion, including conspiracies, is challenged on appeal the correct standard
of review is substantial evidence."' 72 This rule comports with the reason-
159. 573 S.W.2d at 18.
160. Id.
161. Townsley v. State, 538 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
162. Arrendondo v. State, 582 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
163. 575 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
164. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an
offense if he .. .(2) by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual."
165. 574 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
166. 583 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
167. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.07 (Vernon 1974).
168. 583 S.W.2d at 784-85; 574 S.W.2d at 124.
169. See United States v. Teal, 582 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Evans,
572 F.2d 455, 469 (5th Cir. 1978).
170. See United States v. Harbin, 601 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1979). "For an accused to be
convicted of an unlawful conspiracy, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a
conspiracy existed, that he knew of it, and that, with this knowledge, he voluntarily became
a part of it." Id. at 78 1.
171. 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1508, 59 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1979).
172. 590 F.2d at 1382 (emphasis by the court).
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able doubt burden of proof imposed upon the prosecution in all criminal
cases.
United States v. James'73 overruled another long-standing rule of Fifth
Circuit conspiracy cases. The former rule, announced in United States v.
Apollo,'74 required only that the trial judge give a proper cautionary jury
instruction regarding the role of hearsay evidence in conspiracy cases.
This situation arose when co-conspirators' statements were introduced into
evidence. It was necessary for the trial judge to instruct the jurors that the
hearsay statements of co-conspirators could not be considered by the jury
unless proof of the conspiracy was provided by independent, nonhearsay
testimony.' 75 The en banc decision in James requires the trial judge to
make a determination outside the presence of the jury regarding the ad-
missibility of the co-conspirators' statements. 76 The government's sub-
stantial independent evidence must establish a sufficient foundation for
admission of the hearsay statements.
Although a defendant may be found guilty of different substantive and
conspiracy counts in one indictment, he may not be convicted of a conspir-
acy that is a lesser included offense of the substantive offense. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that conspiracy to import marijuana is a
lesser included offense of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. 77
However, when one conviction is for the substantive offense of delivery of
counterfeit bills and another is for conspiracy, both convictions may
stand. 178
So long as conviction for one offense requires proof of a fact not re-
quired for the conviction of the other, there is no double jeopardy.' 79 In
United States v. Cowart'80 the Fifth Circuit adhered to the "separate of-
fense" test of Blockburger v. United States. 8' Blockburger focused on the
elements of the offense charged, not the evidence.' 8 The "same evidence"
test does not apply. The offense of conspiracy requires proof of a conspira-
torial agreement, an element that need not be proved for the crime of aid-
ing and abetting. 83
IX. ROBBERY
The use of force, violence, or intimidation in taking the property distin-
173. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979).
174. 476 F.2d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 1973).
175. See United States v. Escamilla, 590 F.2d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 1979).
176. 590 F.2d at 580-82; cf United States v. Zule, 581 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir. 1978)
(before a co-conspirator's statement may go to the jury, the government must first establish
by independent evidence both the existence of a conspiracy and the accused's participtation
in that conspiracy).
177. See United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1979).
178. See Wilkerson v. United States, 591 F.2d 1046, 1047 (5th Cir. 1979).
179. See United States v. Bankston, 603 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. 595 F.2d 1023, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1979).
181. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
182. Id. at 304.
183. See 595 F.2d at 1034.
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guishes robbery from theft. Traditionally force, violence, or intimidation
elevated a theft offense to robbery only if occurring before or during the
act of taking the property. Further, the property must have been taken by
the defendant with intent to obtain or maintain control. These rules have
changed in Texas with the advent of the present robbery statutes.1'84 Ear-
lier cases held that the use of threats or violence must be antecedent to or
during the taking of the property,'85 a rule overruled by the current rob-
bery statutes.
Lightner v. State'86 set the guidelines for determining whether robbery
has been committed when force is used during the immediate flight after
the attempt or commission of theft. The court of criminal appeals deter-
mined that force or a threat of force used subsequent to the taking supplies
that essential element to the attempted or committed theft to elevate it to
robbery, even though the force is applied to a third person.' 87 It is not
clear whether the essential force element of robbery is supplied in cases in
which the force or threat of force is applied merely as a means to escape.
When there is no completed theft, the robbery defendant is not entitled
to a jury charge on attempted robbery, at least not under the set of facts
presented in Wells v. State.'88 In that case the court held that the case was
properly prosecuted under the robbery statute. 89 The question remains
whether there can ever be attempted robbery in Texas.
Before there can be a valid aggravated robbery indictment, the robbery
statutes require first that robbery must be alleged, and secondly that the
aggravating factors must be alleged.' 90 Failure to allege a robbery, a nec-
essary precondition to a conviction for aggravated robbery, caused reversal
in Exparte County.' 9' The robbery statutes also alter the common law
rules that required the indictment to describe the property and to allege
ownership of the property. In robbery cases prosecuted under an earlier
Texas statute 92 reversible error was committed when the property taken
was not described. 93 Since under the common law robbery was but an
184. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02, 29.03 (Vernon 1974).
185. See Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Spead v. State,
500 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Jones v. State, 467 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971); Johnson v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 140, 141-42, 32 S.W. 537, 538 (1895).
186. 535 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
187. Id. at 177-78.
188. 576 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
189. Id. at 859.
190. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 1974) provides:
A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft .. .and
with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he: (1) intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or
knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or
death.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person commits an offense
if he commits robbery as defined in Section 21.02 . . . , and he: (1) causes serious bodily
injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon." See, e.g., Uiloa v. State, 570
S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
191. 577 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
192. 1895 Tex. Gen Laws, ch. 62, § 1, at 89.
193. See Exparte Cannady, 571 S.W.2d 16, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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aggravated form of theft, the court reasoned that when charging robbery it
was necessary to describe the property. 94 Similarly, in cases prosecuted
under the former robbery statute it was necessary to allege ownership of
the property. Failure to do so rendered the indictment fundamentally de-
fective.' 95 Presently, however, the court has said that the common law
analysis of the nature of a robbery offense no longer applies. At common
law a completed theft was an element of the offense; under section 29.03,
however, a completed theft is not required. Accordingly, the court has
held that an indictment under section 29.03 does not require a description
of the property or an allegation as to ownership.' 96
Although theft may not always be a lesser included offense of robbery,
the court ruled in Campbell v. State97 that in some instances it may be.
When the issue is raised by the evidence, the jury must be charged on the
lesser included offense of theft.' 98 Shortly thereafter, the court interpreted
and applied the Campbell ruling in Eldred v. State. 9 9 Eldred first requires
the state to establish theft in its proof of either robbery or aggravated rob-
bery.2°" Secondly, the entire record, not just the state's evidence, must be
examined to determine whether the jury should have been charged on the
lesser included offense of theft.20' A court must search for evidence that
shows that if appellant is guilty, he is guilty of theft only.20 2 The court in
Eldred also pointed out that when the defensive testimony, if believed,
would prove the defendant was not guilty of any offense, a charge on the
lesser included offense of theft would not be required.20 3
Conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery is rarely prosecuted in Texas.
Such a conviction was obtained and affirmed, however, in Arney v.
State.2° In Arney the appellant argued that the indictment was insuffi-
cient. Although the majority opinion overruled this contention, the dissent
addressed the "bootstrap" or merger theory. Stating that the gist of con-
spiracy 2 5 is the agreement to engage in felonious conduct, the dissenting
judge observed that there is further required an overt act to give the con-
spirators an opportunity to abandon their undertaking.20 6 The overt act
must be one that does more than define the terms and objective of the
194. Id.
195. See Lucero v. State, 502 S.W.2d 128, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Snow v. State, 156
Tex. Crim. 49, 238 S.W.2d 966 (1951) (citing Tex. Pen. Code art. 1408 (1925)).
196. See Ex Parte Lucas, 574 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
197. 571 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). "The issue is not whether the primary
offense is capable of proof on some theory that would not show theft. The issue is whether
the State's case as presented to prove the offense charged included proof of the theft." Id.
198. Id.
199. 578 S.W.2d 721, 722-24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); accord, Williams v. State, 575
S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
200. 578 S.W.2d at 722.
201. Id. at 722-23.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 724.
204. 580 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
205. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1974).
206. 580 S.W.2d at 841 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
1980]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
agreement.2"7 In Arney the overt act alleged to be in pursuance of the
agreement was that the appellant had shot the victim with a gun while
attempting to rob him.2"8 The dissenting judge stated:
Convinced, therefore, that the indictment in this cause clearly alleges
an intent and agreement to commit the offense of robbery in describ-
ing the criminal conspiracy, I dissent to application of the notion that
an allegation of an overt act involving using or exhibiting a deadly
weapon may be utilized to "bootstrap" the offense to the higher grade
of aggravated robbery.209
X. BURGLARY
A panel of the court of criminal appeals found the indictment for bur-
glary of a habitation 210 in Holcomb v. State21' to be fundamentally defec-
tive for failure to allege a culpable mental state. The indictment alleged
that the defendant "did then and there unlawfully enter a habitation with-
out the effective consent of [the victim] and therein attempted to commit
rape."'2 2 The state unsuccessfully argued that Teniente v. State2 3 ap-
plied.2t In Teniente the allegation that the entry was "with the intent to
commit theft" was held to be sufficient to allege the necessary culpable
mental state. 2t 5 The specific intent alleged stood in lieu of any other re-
quired allegation, and the indictment was not therefore defective. The ap-
plication of Dovalina v. State216 likewise proved ineffectual in rescuing this
indictment.2t7 In Dovalina the indictment for attempted capital murder
had been deemed sufficient. The allegation that the defendant "did then
and there unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally attempt to cause the
death" of the victim sufficed even though there was no allegation of spe-
cific intent to commit the offense of murder.2t" An allegation of attempt
may be substituted for intent.2t9 The words, "attempt to cause the death"
of an individual necessarily include the intent to cause the death of an
individual.220
Under Greene v. Massey22 1 and Burks v. United States222 an indictment
will not be ordered dismissed when the case is reversed because the evi-
207. Id.
208. Id. at 839.
209. Id. at 841.
210. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).
211. 573 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
212. Id. at 815.
213. 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
214. 573 S.W.2d at 815.
215. 533 S.W.2d at 805-06.
216. 564 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
217. 573 S.W.2d at 815-16.
218. 564 S.W.2d at 379-81.
219. Id. at 380.
220. Id. at 381. This construction of the words "attempt" and "intent" raises such ques-
tions as whether an allegation of attempted rape includes within its meaning "with the intent
to commit rape."
221. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
222. 437 U.S. I (1978); see text accompanying notes 56-68 rupra.
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dence in a burglary of habitation case is insufficient. Rather, the defend-
ant may be retried for the lesser included offense of burglary of a
building.
223
When alleging that a person previously convicted of a felony involving
an act of violence possessed a firearm, the state may track and state a con-
clusory allegation. In Bates v. State224 the court reaffirmed that burglary is
an act of violence to property that may be alleged in the indictment and
that it is not necessary to allege specific evidentiary facts to show that the
burglary involved acts of violence to the property.225
In further definition of "habitation, ' 226 the court of criminal appeals has
excluded from the meaning of habitation an entry upon an unenclosed and
unsecured stairway attached to a residence. 227 The trial court's charge
should state that mere entry upon the stairway alone would not be bur-
glary of a habitation.228
In Garcia v. State229 revocation of probation based upon a charge of
burglary of a habitation was reversed because the proof failed. The state
abandoned the burglary allegation and proceeded to the lesser included
offense of theft in the "Motion to Revoke. '230 The court held that theft is




In Smith v. State232 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that if a
theft indictment alleges that the property taken has a value of over $200,
but fails to allege it has a value of less than $10,000, the indictment is not
fundamentally defective. Although such allegations set out a felony, there
is no notice to the defendant of the possible felony punishment range. A
defendant, therefore, would not know whether he is charged with a second
or a third degree felony.233 The court held that such failure to allege the
maximum value of the property prohibits conviction for theft over $10,000
even if the proof establishes this amount. A third degree felony conviction,
however, may be had without fundamental error.234
Two cases caution that when merchandise belonging to a store is ob-
tained by the defendant in a theft case, someone other than the security
officer in the case may be required to be named as the "owner" in the
223. See Moss v. State, 574 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
224. 571 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
225. Id. at 930.
226. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).
227. See Swain v. State, 583 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
228. Id.
229. 571 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
230. Id. at 898.
231. Id. at 899.
232. 573 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
233. Id. at 547; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(4)-(5) (Vernon 1974) which pro-
vide, in part: "An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if the value of the
property stolen is $200 or more but less than $10,000... [and] a felony of the second degree
if the value of the property stolen is $10,000 or more .
234. 573 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
1980]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
indictment.235 The security officer cannot be the owner unless it is shown
he has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or
not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.236 The
court does not state that a security guard may never be the "owner"; thus,
under some circumstances, this allegation could be proper.
In Mulchahey v. State,237 a "receiving and concealing" case, the court
reiterated that under the 1974 Penal Code, theft and receiving and con-
cealing now constitute one offense, theft.238 The elements of the offenses
of theft and of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle 239 are the same except
that theft contains the additional element of an intent to deprive the owner
of property.24° Further, the term "appropriate" includes the operation of a
motor vehicle. 24' Because the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehi-
cle can be proved by the same or less than all the facts necessary to prove
theft, it is a lesser included offense of theft.242
In some instances issuance of a bad check may be a lesser included of-
fense of theft, such as when the state fails to prove that the defendant ob-
tained property or fails to prove the property's value.24 3 Although the
statute penalizing issuance of a bad check 21 is a specific statute, it is not a
special statute that encompasses all theft by check offenses. Under the
facts in Christiansen v. State,245 in which the state proved theft, the trial
court was not required to charge the jury on issuance of a bad check.
The state, in Wages v. State,246 indicted the defendant for third degree
felony theft. Three misdemeanor theft cases were aggregated and defend-
ant was convicted for a third degree felony theft enhanced by one prior
felony conviction for burglary.247 On appeal the appellant contended that
to allow aggregation of the three misdemeanor theft amounts, and to allow
enhancement at the same time, effectively increased the punishment from
a Class A misdemeanor to a second degree felony, which represented an
increase from a possible maximum of one year in the county jail for each
of the three offenses to fifteen years and one day in the penitentiary, his
ultimate sentence.248 Affirming the conviction, the court held that such
procedure was proper and that enhancement did not constitute cruel and
235. Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); McGee v. State, 572
S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
236. 572 S.W.2d at 724.
237. 574 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
238. Id. at 113; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.02 (Vernon 1974).
239. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (Vernon 1974).
240. Neely v. State, 571 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Christiansen v. State, 575 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
244. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.41(a) (Vernon 1974) provides that a person commits
an offense if he issues or passes a check for payment of money knowing that the issuer does
not have sufficient funds in the bank for payment in full of the check and other checks
outstanding at the time of issuance.
245. 575 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
246. 573 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
247. Id. at 804-05.




Construing the hybrid "labor-property" provisions of the theft stat-
utes, 250 the court determined in Chance v. State25 1 that the auto repair
transaction in that case was not hybrid.2 52 Thus, theft of services in excess
of $200 was not proved because the services were not clearly distinguisha-
ble from the property.2 53 As a solution to this kind of problem, the court
suggested that the offenses be aggregated in one indictment. 25 4 The con-
duct could then be considered as one offense, the same transaction involv-
ing theft of services and property arising from repairs to one automobile,
and set out as separate counts of one indictment.
In Cortez v. State255 the court construed the term "deception" as used in
the theft by a check statute.2 56 Applying a strict construction of the term,
the court stated that any deception that occurs after the other person has
completed performance of the service allegedly stolen would not meet the
requirement that the deception must be such as is likely to affect the judg-
ment of another in the transaction.257 A later deception is not capable of
affecting retrospectively judgment as to what has already been com-
pleted.25 8
Despite a new penal code, courts still scrutinize forgery cases. Appeal-
ing successfully from a conviction for passing a forged check,259 the appel-
lant in Armstrong v. State 26  argued that there was a fatal variance
between the check set out in the indictment and the check introduced into
evidence by the prosecution. The fatal variance, held the court, was in the
bank transit number and the date on the checks. In the indictment the
check bore the number "88-135" and the date "2/19/74." The check in
evidence showed the bank transit number to be "88-1135" and was dated
"12/19/74." The court employed the terms "strictest proof' and "almost
minute precision" to describe the conformity required between the indict-
ment and the check introduced in evidence.2 6'
In Minix v. State,2 62 a prosecution for forgery by possession with intent
249. Id. at 806.
250. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(7)(A) (Vernon 1974) states that labor and profes-
sional service are included in the term "service."
251. 579 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
252. Id. at 474.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 475.
255. 582 S.W.2d 119, 120-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
256. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(2) (Vernon 1974).
257. 582 S.W.2d at 121.
258. Id.
259. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.2 1(a)(l)(A)(i) (Vernon 1974), which provides that
"forge" means to alter, make, complete, execute or authenticate any writing so that it pur-
ports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act. Subsection (b) states that a
person commits an offense if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another. Id.
§ 32.21(b).
260. 573 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
261. Id. at 814.
262. 579 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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to utter,263 the court applied the haec verba rule: when the check is set out
haec verba in the indictment, the requirement that the forged instrument
"purports to be the act of another" is fulfilled, so long as the name of the
maker is different from the name of the defendant.264 The court further
noted that the person "who did not authorize the act" must be included as
an essential element. 265 As in Minix, therefore, simply stating that the
check purported to be the act of another will not, of itself, imply that the
act was without lawful authority. The specific allegation noted above must
be included to avoid fundamental error.266
XII. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Overcoming a strong dissent, in United States v. Hernandez2 67 the Fifth
Circuit, en banc, applied the rule of lenity announced in Bell v. United
States 68 to the case and remanded for resentencing.2 69 The dissent stated
that lenity was inappropriate because severity, not lenity, of punishment in
narcotics cases was the intent of Congress.270 The defendant was con-
victed for possession with intent to distribute and for distribution of her-
oin, both violations of the same statute.27 ' These offenses arose from a
single transaction, a sale of heroin to undercover agents. Quoting from
Bell, the court said: " 'When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of
imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of lenity. . . .Doubt will be resolved against turning a single
transaction into multiple offenses ... 272 Joining the other circuits
confronted with the same question of a concurrent charge of possession
with intent to distribute and of distribution, 73 the court affirmed the con-
viction, but vacated one of the sentences.2 74 In a single transaction the
Fifth Circuit now will refuse to permit double punishment for possession
with intent to distribute and for distribution itself
2 75
Two elements must be proven to show "possession" of a controlled sub-
stance in a state prosecution: (1) that the accused exercised care, control,
and management over the contraband, and (2) that the accused knew that
263. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(C) (Vernon 1974).
264. 579 S.W.2d at 467.
265. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(i) (Vernon 1974).
266. 579 S.W.2d at 467.
267. 591 F.2d 1019, 1022-28 (5th Cir. 1979).
268. 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955).
269. 591 F.2d at 1022.
270. Id. at 1027-28 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 1025; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I) (1976).
272. 591 F.2d at 1021 (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) (emphasis
omitted)).
273. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
274. 591 F.2d at 1022.
275. The court observed that, under the facts in this case, the conduct merged into a
single offense. The court confined its decision, however, to the specific facts before it, and
indicated that consecutive sentences might be imposed for possession with intent to dis-
tribute and distribution if there were "separate evidence of possession with intent to dis-
tribute and evidence of distribution in one or more different transactions." Id.
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the matter possessed was contraband.276 Many convictions have fallen for
failure to prove possession, and the possibility of revival in a new trial has
been made impossible by the double jeopardy decisions of Burk 277 and
Greene. 27' Failure to prove either of these elements of possession will re-
sult in insufficient evidence to support a conviction, thereby requiring dis-
missal.279
An indictment for delivery of marijuana280 must allege the quantity of
marijuana that was offered to be sold or whether the offer to sell was for
renumeration; otherwise the indictment fails to allege a felony offense.2 '
It does, however, allege a misdemeanor offense.
Attempted violations of the Controlled Substances Act282 are not of-
fenses against state law. 283 The Act does not contain a general attempt
provision.284 Further, the attempt provisions of the penal laws do not ap-
ply to the Controlled Substances Act.285
XIII. SEX OFFENSES
The question of what constitutes aggravated rape286 has been posed
often during this survey period. The rape statutes do not, on their face,
answer some defensive questions. Gross v. State28 7 tested whether the in-
dictment for aggravated rape must allege to whom the threat of imminent
infliction of death was directed. The appellant asserted that such an omis-
sion in the indictment constituted error. The court agreed, but affirmed
the conviction because the defendant was convicted for the lesser included
offense of rape.288 The defendant was not harmed because the testimony
admitted by the trial judge would have been admissible to show the plain
276. Heltcel v. State, 583 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (emphasis added).
277. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
278. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
279. See 583 S.W.2d at 792; Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);
Sewell v. State, 578 S.W.2d 131, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Pierce v. State, 577 S.W.2d 253,
256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Reyes v. State, 575 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);
Shults v. State, 575 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Wilkes v. State, 572 S.W.2d 538,
540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
280. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, §§ 1.02(8), .02(17), 2.03(d)(10),
4.05(d) (Vernon 1976).
281. See Exparte Osbourn, 574 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Whitaker v.
State, 572 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
282. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Vernon 1976).
283. See Exparte Brantley, 574 S.W.2d 567, 567-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
284. Id. at 567.
285. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.03(b) (Vernon 1974), which provides, in part, that
the provisions of titles 1, 2, and 3 of the code apply to offenses defined by other laws. The
criminal attempts statute is in title 4.
286. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.03(a) (Vernon 1974) states:
A person commits an offense if he commits rape as defined . . . or rape of a
child as defined . . . and he: (i) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to
cause death to the victim or another in the course of the same criminal epi-
sode; and (2) compels submission . . . by threat of death, serious bodily in-
jury, or kidnapping to be imminently inflicted on anyone.
287. 580 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
288. Id. at 588.
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offense of rape by "force and threats," in any event. 289
Nor is it required that an indictment for aggravated rape set out or de-
scribe the specific actions or deeds of the defendant that communicated the
threat of serious bodily injury to the prosecutrix. 290 Thus an indictment
alleging that "the Defendant did intentionally and knowingly compel the
Complainant to submit to the said act of sexual intercourse by threatening
serious bodily injury to be imminently inflicted on the Complainant" was
sufficient.29 i
The appellant in Berry v. State292 contended that although the evidence
may have shown rape, it was insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggra-
vated rape. The evidence consisted of the complainant's testimony that the
object placed at the back of her neck "felt like a knife," but that she never
saw it.29' After he had driven her around town in his car, stopping occa-
sionally to speak to his acquaintances, during which time she testified she
was in fear of her life, the defendant took the complainant to an apartment
where he raped her. The woman never saw a weapon. The court held that
the appellant indicated by action or words that he had a weapon and that
he would use it if she resisted. These acts, coupled with his threats, are
sufficient evidence of a threat of serious bodily injury.2 94 The concurring
opinion noted that the inquiry centered on whether there was a threat of
serious bodily injury since there was no threat to kill. Although reluctant
to agree, the concurring judge found that the testimony of the sharp object
placed on the neck of complainant plus the later discovery of a putty knife
in the defendant's car was sufficient to sustain the aggravated rape convic-
tion. 29 1 "[T]hreats may be communicated by acts and deeds as well as
words . . 296
The court emphasized in Rogers v. State,297 however, that a threat of
future harm will not support a finding of aggravating circumstances.
298
The court enumerated the circumstances that would support such a find-
ing. They are: "[A] showing that a gun or knife was used, or a threat to
kill the victim was made, or serious bodily injury was inflicted, or a combi-
nation of two or more of these factors." 299 In Little v. State3°° the defend-
ant struck the complainant, breaking her jaw and causing her to lose
consciousness. When she regained consciousness, and while the rape oc-
curred, the defendant threatened to kill her.3° ' These circumstances ele-
289. Id.
290. Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
291. Id.
292. 579 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
293. Id. at 489.
294. Id. at 489-90.
295. Id. at 492 (Onion, J., concurring).
296. Id. (citations omitted).
297. 575 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
298. Id. at 559.
299. Id. (footnote omitted); accord, Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979).
300. 573 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
301. Id. at 776.
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vated the rape to aggravated rape. When no weapon is displayed,
however, Blount v. State302 held that the threat of death or serious bodily
injury, made after the rape and to prevent the rape from being reported,
will not suffice as an aggravating circumstance. In Bright v. State313 the
court, affirming an aggravated rape conviction, distinguished Blount. In
Bright the death threats were made before the rape to compel submis-
sion.3° In Blount they were made after the rape.3°5 The threats in Bright
were neither conditional nor indefinite as to time.3°6
Can a substitute victim volunteer herself in an about-to-happen aggra-
vated rape? In Brown v. State30 7 the victim offered to substitute herself to
prevent the apparently imminent aggravated rape of her younger friend.
The court affirmed the conviction, stating that the fact that the victim "vol-
unteered" did not constitute consent to the intercourse, thereby removing
an essential element of the offense. 3 8 The court analogized the victim's
acts to those of a mother protecting her daughter. 30 9 The court further
concluded that the defendant's display of a gun and his words and actions
were sufficient to overcome resistance. This imminent threat of death or
serious bodily injury was sufficient to aggravate the rape offense.310
In Kirtley v. State3 1 1 the court said the dispositive issue was the meaning
of "public place," as that term is used in the public lewdness statute.31 2 In
Kirtley the defendant apparently took his new secretary out to lunch and
while in his automobile, his hand came in contact with her breast.31 3 The
court held that for the purpose of this case, the motor vehicle was not a
"public place.",314 The court carefully noted, however, that this holding
does not establish a per se rule that a motor vehicle traveling on a public
road is not a public place.
3 15
Jacquez v. State3 16 was a prosecution for indecency with a child.3 17 Be-
cause the indictment alleged that the victims were two male children, the
defendant argued that the indictment was defective for failing to allege
each was "not his spouse. ,31 8 The court pointed out that marriage in any
manner would be impossible. Although no Texas case has held that the
words "not his spouse" are not an essential element of the offense, the
court stated that the defendant was apprised of the charge against him and
302. 542 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
303. 585 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
304. Id. at 742.
305. 542 S.W.2d at 165-66.
306. 585 S.W.2d at 742.
307. 576 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
308. Id. at 823.
309. Id. at 823-24.
310. Id. at 824.
311. 585 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
312. Id. at 725; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.07 (Vernon 1974).
313. 585 S.W.2d at 725.
314. Id. at 726.
315. Id.
316. 579 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
317. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11 (Vernon 1974).
318. 579 S.W.2d at 248.
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could prepare his defense. His substantial rights were not prejudiced by
the omission of which he complained. 1 9
The wife of the defendant in Garcia v. State32° testified against him, over
objection, and his conviction for indecency with a child was affirmed. The
question was whether this case came within the exception stated within
article 38.11 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.32' This article pro-
vides that the spouse may testify against the other when the case involves
any grade of assault or violence committed by one against the other or
against a child under sixteen years of age.322 The court applied that statute
in this indecency with a child case. The victim named in the indictment
was the thirteen-year-old daughter of the defendant and his wife. The
court stated that the criterion for determining whether this was an offense
involving assault was an examination of the facts and circumstances of the
case, not the allegations of the indictment.323 Here the facts showed an
assault.324 The court concluded that the wife was a competent witness in
the case.325 It is apparent that the facts in this kind of offense will often
come within the statutory exception permitting the spouse to testify against
the other. The exception would not apply when there is no assault in-
volved in the indecency with a child case.
In Briceno v. State,326 another indecency case, the appellant contended
that the court erred in failing to charge on the lesser included offense of
indecent exposure.327 The court held that indecent exposure is a lesser
included offense of indecency with a child. The lesser included offense was
established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to estab-
lish the offense charged.3 28 Appellant's testimony raised the issue whether
he acted "recklessly" about the presence of another, a requirement of inde-
cent exposure, or whether he "knew" of the child's presence, a requirement
for indecency with a child.329 Consequently, the trial court should have
charged on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure.33 °
In Floyd v. State33 1 the court of criminal appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of the prostitution 332 and aggravated promotion of prostitution
statutes.333 The holding stated that section 43.04 was not ambiguous and
vague and that the appellant had sufficient notice of the conduct pro-
scribed by the statute and was therefore not deprived of his right to proce-
319. Id. at 249.
320. 573 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
321. Id. at 15.
322. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1974).
323. 573 S.W.2d at 15.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 16.
326. 580 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
327. Id. at 843; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08 (Vernon 1974).
328. 580 S.W.2d at 844.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. 575 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
332. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
333. Id. § 43.04 (Vernon 1974).
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dural due process. 334
XIV. WEAPONS
With the en banc decision of Denham v. State335 the court of criminal
appeals resolved former difficulties encountered in determining what is a
"deadly weapon. 336 The source of the disagreements in Harris v. State
337
and Danzig v. State338 was the definition of "deadly weapon" in the Texas
Penal Code.339 A knife is not a deadly weapon per se; thus the manner of
its use or intended use showing its capability of causing death or serious
bodily injury must be proven when the offense is based upon a statute
requiring the aggravating factor. In both Harris and Danzig the courts
held that expert testimony was required before the severity of the wounds
could be determined.34° Denham v. State expressly overruled those two
cases to the extent that a lay witness may now competently testify to facts
that will authorize the jury to find that a knife is a deadly weapon.34' In-
terestingly, Calvin v. State,342 although published the same date as
Denham, consisted only of the dissent, which advocated the overruling of
Harris and Danzig and chastised the majority for their inconsistencies in
"deadly weapon" cases involving knives. Apparently, in light of Denham,
inconsistencies in this kind of case will now occur rarely.343
When the weapon that is carried by the defendant is not one defined or
listed as prohibited by the Penal Code, 3  the allegations in the pleading
must assert that the instrument is one that is specifically designed, made, or
adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death by
striking a person with the instrument. In Loya v. State345 these require-
ments were not met, and the court reversed because the instrument alleged
in the information was a tire iron. Further, the complaint and information
did not allege a violation of section 46.02, which prohibits the unlawful
carrying of weapons.346
334. 575 S.W.2d at 24.
335. 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
336. See, e.g., Butts, Criminal Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 481, 482
(1979).
337. 562 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
338. 546 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
339. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(i 1) (Vernon 1974), which states that "deadly
weapon" means: "(A) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the
purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (B) anything that in the manner of its
use or intended use is capable to causing death or serious bodily injury."
340. See 562 S.W.2d at 466-67; 546 S.W.2d at 302.
341. 574 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
342. 577 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
343. See Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Cruz v. State, 576
S.W.2d 841, 842-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); cf. Hubbard v. State, 579 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979) (whether lay or expert testimony is required will depend on a case-by-case
analysis of the evidence).
344. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 46.01, .06 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1980).
345. 571 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
346. Id.
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In two cases 3 4 7 appellants argued unsuccessfully that the prosecution is
required to prove that the firearm in the case was not an antique or cu-
rio.348 The courts pointed out that the defendant is required to raise the
matter as an affirmative defense and that the state is not required to prove
that the weapon is not an antique or curio.34 9 Without explaining its
meaning, however, the court in an earlier case held that the "firearms"
statute does not automatically exclude all firearms made before 1899; it
excludes from the definition of firearm only those antique or curio firearms
manufactured before that date. 35° The question becomes: when is a gun
manufactured before 1899 not an antique? Another case further delimited
the scope of deadly weapons, holding that an air pistol is a deadly weapon
because it is "manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of
inflicting death or serious bodily injury." 351
The court affirmed a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by
a felon in Shepperd v. State352 and held that the statute353 is a legitimate
exercise of the Texas Consitution's 354 directive that the bearing of arms be
regulated.355 The Texas Constitution does not protect the possession of
firearms by a felon.356
XV. JUVENILE LAW
The sanctions of Ex parte Menefee,357 concerning the juvenile who is
transferred from juvenile court to be tried as an adult, have been solidified
in White v. State.358 In a five-to-four decision the majority reaffirmed the
due process mandate of Menefee3 9 that the accused juvenile is protected
by the following three-step procedure. 360 First, the juvenile court must
waive jurisdiction and transfer to the district court. Secondly, the district
court to which the case is transferred must conduct an examining trial.
That court may find "no probable cause" and remand the case to the juve-
nile court, which resumes jurisdiction. Thirdly, following the examining
trial the grand jury must return an indictment. The grand jury may de-
cline to return an indictment, in which event the district court so certifies
347. Wright v. State, 582 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Jackson v. State, 575
S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
348. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.06(d) (Vernon 1974), which provides that it is an
affirmative defense that the actor's conduct was incidental to dealing with a switchblade
knife, springblade knife, or short-barrel firearm solely as an antique or curio.
349. See 582 S.W.2d at 846; 575 S.W.2d at 569.
350. Scott v. State, 571 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
351. Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (citation omitted).
352. 586 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
353. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.05(a) (Vernon 1974). "A person who has been con-
victed of a felony involving an act of violence or threatened violence to a person or property
commits an offense if he possesses a firearm away from the premises where he lives." Id.
354. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23.
355. 586 S.W.2d at 502.
356. Id. at 504.
357. 561 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
358. 576 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
359. Id. at 844-45.
360. 561 S.W.2d at 828.
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and remands the case to the juvenile court jurisdiction.36' The juvenile is
thus afforded three separate opportunities to remain within the juvenile
court's jurisdiction and not to be tried as an adult.
The examining trial is a valuable right, for it furnishes another opportu-
nity to have the criminal proceeding against the juvenile terminated and
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court resumed. It is the second vital step in
determining whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult. Therefore,
when an indictment is returned prior to an examining trial, that indictment
is void, the district court has no jurisdiction to proceed, and any resulting
conviction will be set aside.36 2 The court, however, has held that the juve-
nile may properly waive the examining trial pursuant to section 51.09(a) of
the Family Code.3 63
The dissenters in White sharply criticized the underlying premise of
Menefee.364 The minority equated the juvenile examining trial with the
criminal defendant's examining trial. Since the defendant in a felony pros-
ecution is not always afforded an examining trial as a matter of right, and
since an indictment terminates the right to such a hearing, this reasoning,
they believed, should apply to the juvenile.365 Further the legislative pro-
vision for an appeal from the transfer order reflects the legislative intent at
the juvenile court level.366 On the other hand, in his concurring opinion,
Presiding Judge Onion, author of both Menefee and Criss v. State,367 ele-
vated the examining trial of the juvenile above that of the adult and main-
tained that it is a requisite step before a valid indictment may be returned
against one who, at the time of the offense, was not yet seventeen years of
age.368 Absent a showing in the record of an examining trial or a waiver
361. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(h) (Vernon 1975):
If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it shall state specifically in the order
its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including the written order and
findings of the court, and transfer the child to the appropriate court for crimi-
nal proceedings. On transfer of the child for criminal proceedings, he shall be
dealt with as an adult and in accordance with the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1965. The transfer of custody is an arrest. The examining trial
shall be conducted by the court to which the case was transferred, which may
remand the child to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
See also id. § 54.02(i):
If the child's case is brought to the attention of the grand jury and the grand
jury does not indict for the offense charged in the complaint forwarded by the
juvenile court, the district court or criminal district court shall certify the
grand jury's failure to indict to the juvenile court. On receipt of the certifica-
tion, the juvenile court may resume jurisdiction of the case.
362. White v. State, 576 S.W.2d at 844; accord, Clark v. State, 579 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Menefee, 561 S.W.2d 822, 829-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
363. See Criss v. State, 563 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.09(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980) provides, in part: "Unless a contrary intent clearly
appears elsewhere in this title, any right granted to a child by this title or by the constitution
or laws of this state or the United States may be waived in proceedings under this title
364. 576 S.W.2d at 850-51 (Davis, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 852.
366. Id. at 851.
367. 563 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
368. 576 S.W.2d at 848-49.
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thereof, the juvenile is denied due process. The White majority held that
absent the waiver, there will be no presumption of regularity of the pro-
ceedings.369
Of further interest is the White court's consideration of this issue "in the
interest of justice, 37° under authority of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. 37 ' The issue in all of the examining trial cases is whether the con-
victing district court ever acquired jurisdiction. Following Menefee, Criss,
and White, the court has granted relief by post-conviction writ, holding
that the indictments in such cases are void and must be dismissed.372
During the survey period the question arose as to the correct disposition
of the case when the district court did provide the required examining trial,
in which it found "no probable cause." The court then dismissed the
charges but retained jurisdiction instead of remanding to the juvenile
court. Following dismissal of the charges against the juvenile, who by then
was seventeen years of age, the grand jury returned indictments against
him.37 3 The court of criminal appeals answered the question by holding
that the last action of the grand jury was also void because the juvenile
court must, in that event, resume jurisdiction.374
Since the denial of an examining trial to the juvenile assumes constitu-
tional proportions, this denial may be attacked for the first time on an
appeal of a probation revocation or by way of post-conviction writ.37 5 The
court has held that since the indictment for the original offense was void,
the juvenile must be released from any further confinement resulting from
his conviction under such indictment. 376
The legislature settled the question of county court and statutory county
court jurisdiction in juvenile matters377 by enacting a law authorizing each
district court, county court, and statutory county court exercising any of
the constitutional jurisdiction of a county or district court to be designated
as a juvenile court. If the juvenile judge is not a lawyer, a trial de novo
may be had on appeal.378
369. Id. at 845.
370. Id. at 844.
371. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09, § 13 (Vernon 1979).
372. Exparte Trehan, No. 62, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 1979); Exparte Hunter,
581 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparle Brooks, 579 S.W.2d 250, 251-52 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Gloston, 579 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparte
Juarez, 579 S.W.2d 21 I, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparte Ytuarte, 579 S.W.2d 210, 211
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Exparle LeBlanc, 577 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
373. Exparte Spencer, 579 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
374. Id. at 244-45.
375. See Exparte Ridgeway, 579 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
376. Id. at 936.
377. See In re G.B.B., 572 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ) (county
court had jurisdiction to consider juvenile matters); E.S. v. State, 536 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ.
App-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (judge of county court at law has no authority to act for
county judge in juvenile matters).
378. See 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 178, § 1, at 387-88 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.




The Texas state defendant may look to three areas of substantive crimi-
nal law for fundamental error: first, to the charging instrument, which
must allege every essential element of the offense; secondly, to the evidence
at trial, which must be "sufficient"; thirdly, to the court's charge to the
jury, which must correctly apply all of the law, including essential ele-
ments of the offense, to the facts of the case. The area in which fundamen-
tal error occurs determines disposition of that case. The court may order
outright dismissal of the fatally defective charging instrument, the result
being that the defendant no longer is accused of the crime. The court may
find an insufficiency of evidence, which bars retrial of the defendant for
that offense. In both of these instances the defendant is not limited to di-
rect attack by way of appeal; he may properly seek post-conviction relief.
The jury charge, however, is a different matter. Like the other two "ar-
eas," any fundamental error in the jury instructions may be attacked on
appeal without a trial objection having been made. Only, however, when
the jury charge wholly fails to apply the law to the facts of the case,
thereby raising the error to the required constitutional dimension, can this
otherwise fundamental error be attacked by habeas corpus proceedings.
Limiting collateral attacks based upon jury instructions may be viewed as
a curtailment of the number of cases to be determined by the court of
criminal appeals. When one considers the due process protections af-
forded the defendant throughout his trial and the magnitude of the appel-
late procedure in Texas, this procedure is understandable.
1980]

